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ABSTRACT
Policy-makers and scientists often expect that controversies in public policy can be
solved by gatheringmore knowledge, even though this linear model of expertise is
widely criticised in social studies of science. To shedmore light on this expectation,
the role of scientific uncertainties in controversies on mussel fishery in the Dutch
Wadden Sea (1990–2016) is investigated. The analysis shows that mussel fishery
regulation decisions were primarily based on government authority, not on scien-
tific knowledge. Expectations of policy-makers and scientists on conflict resolution
bymore researchwere notmet, because the knowledgedebatewas politicisedover
ambiguous knowledge claims. The controversy was depoliticised by a political
covenant between the conflicting parties. The case study confirms that science-
based knowledge fails to guide policy-making as expected in the linear model, and
demonstrates how science plays important strategic, procedural and instrumental
roles in structuring interactions between stakeholders in nature protection conflicts.
KEYWORDS Depoliticisation; knowledge expectations; knowledge uncertainties; science-policy
interactions; mussel fishery; Wadden Sea
Introduction
Policy-makers and scientists often expect that scientific knowledge will conclu-
sively solve conflicts in public debates. The underlying assumption is that, with
the right knowledge, the appropriate decision should be clear. This linear model
of expertise has become dominant among scientists, policy-makers and advisors
(Pielke 2007, Beck 2011) in the field of protected nature areas (Beunen and
Duineveld 2010, Turnhout et al. 2015, Floor et al. 2016). By analysing debates
concerning the mussel fishery in the Dutch Wadden Sea (1990–2016), we
critically assess the linear model. The mussel fishery case is an exemplary case
of high expectations of scientific knowledge and simultaneously contested
expertise. Several scholars have analysed the role of expertise and knowledge
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in the governance process of shellfish fisheries in the Wadden Sea region (Floor
et al. 2013, Van Der Molen et al. 2015). Our research builds upon this work and
focuses on the expected depoliticising role of knowledge from 1990 to 2016.
In analysing the roles of knowledge, we build on previous critical studies of
knowledge use in environmental decision-making (Jasanoff 1994, Weingart
1999, Huitema and Turnhout 2009, Wesselink et al. 2013). The linear model
assumes that science will provide policy actors with the knowledge required to
resolve controversies (Beck 2011). The main criticism of this dominant model is
its assumption of a clear boundary between science and policy (Beck 2011, Carter
2013, Wesselink et al. 2013), while science-policy interactions can better be
understood as ‘multiple, two-way and dynamic interactions between processes
of knowledge production and decision-making’ (Wesselink et al. 2013, p. 2). We
analyse these dynamic interactions with the concepts of politicisation and depo-
liticisation. Politicisation refers to the confrontation of different positions about
a human activity in the public debate (Mouffe 2000, Pellizzoni 2011); here, a shift
occurs from a situation where a human activity was perceived as necessary,
private and requiring no regulation towards a situation where human activity
is a topic of public debate. For example, claims of interest groups and knowledge
claims of science-based experts can trigger the politicisation process.
Politicisation is ‘the opening, broadening or restoring of a public space of
discussion. An issue (or part of it) is politicised to the extent that it is released
from necessity and duty: different positions can be confronted in the public
arena’ (Pellizzoni 2011, p. 711). Depoliticisation refers to the process of ending
controversies, by removing these conflicting issues from the public debate and
defining them as non-controversial, for example by placing them in the domain
of scientific expertise (Behagel 2012).
In our analysis, we distinguish two interconnected and parallel debates:
the regulation debate and the knowledge debate. The regulation debate in
nature protection is about which human activities are allowable in a nature
area and under what conditions. The knowledge debate is about what is
known and whether there is sufficient knowledge to make decisions. We
critically examine the ‘linear’ assumption that the knowledge debate needs
to be closed to end the regulation debate (Beck 2011, Hoppe 2005). First, we
present our conceptual framework of depoliticisation mechanisms and
different types of uncertainties. Then, we use this framework to describe
and analyse the mussel fishery controversy.
Analytical framework
Depoliticisation mechanisms
Several decision-making mechanisms can reduce the public debate on
a controversial issue. We distinguish four depoliticisation mechanisms
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based on Van Koppen (2002): decisionist, technocratic, participatory and
market (see Table 1). We approach these decision-making mechanisms as
ideal types. To function as a depoliticisation mechanism, the actors
involved should accept the type of decision-making as legitimate, and the
decision-maker(s) should be able to reach a decision.
These depoliticisation mechanisms are based on different types of legiti-
macy and knowledge use. The decisionist mechanism uses the legitimacy of the
governmental authority (such as elected politicians or appointed officials) to
make decisions. Knowledge as advice can play a supporting role in this process
(Hoppe 2005). The technocratic mechanism relies on the legitimacy of experts
and their scientific arguments to justify decisions (Weingart 1999). Knowledge
is the main factor to guide decisions. In radical technocratic decision-making,
scientists replace politicians; in a less radical version ‘experts hold de facto
power in the day-to-day business of administration and politics because
scientific knowledge and its corresponding technical-practical tools have colo-
nised the administrative and political worlds’ (Hoppe 2005, p. 209). The
participatory approach centres on the premise that affected actors should
make decisions. It is crucial that all relevant stakeholders are included.
Stakeholder and science-based knowledge can play a supportive role. The
market mechanism centres on the ideology that market forces serve the
common good, transferring the issue of decision-making to individuals collec-
tively (Van Koppen 2002). Knowledge that informs market players can play
a role, such as information on product labels.
In our analysis of the mussel fishery decision-making, we focus on the
legitimation of decisions and the role of knowledge production in these
decisions. We consider that knowledge has a role in all depoliticisation
mechanisms but is most prominent in the technocratic approach.
Table 1. Decisionist, technocratic, participatory and market depoliticisation mechan-
isms (based on Van Koppen 2002).
Depoliticisation mechanism
Decisionist ‘Let the authority handle it’, transfer to political hierarchy.
The political position of the decision-maker justifies decisions.
Technocratic ‘Let the experts handle it’, transfer to the science-based expert domain.
Scientific consensus justifies decisions.
Participatory ‘Let the stakeholders decide’, transfer to the semi-private stakeholder domain.
An agreement between all relevant actors justifies decisions.
Market ‘Leave it to the market’, transfer to the private domain.
The perception that market forces serve the common good justifies decisions.
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Knowledge uncertainties
In all depoliticisation mechanisms, the role of knowledge is complicated
when knowledge uncertainties are considered. Knowledge uncertainties can
fuel knowledge debates, and vice versa. As a result, knowledge claims can be
undermined or become controversial. We analytically distinguish three
types of perceptions of uncertainty: incomplete knowledge, unpredictability
and ambiguity (Van Den Hoek 2014, Floor et al. 2016) – see Figure 1. The
uncertainty of incomplete knowledge links to perceived imperfection of
knowledge: things are currently unknown but potentially available through
additional research. The uncertainty of unpredictability addresses unknow-
able knowledge: given the present state of science, science cannot reduce
this uncertainty. The uncertainty of ambiguity concerns actors knowing
differently rather than not knowing enough. Here, ambiguity is defined as
‘the existence of two or more equally plausible interpretation possibilities’
(Dewulf et al. 2005, p. 116).
Different types of uncertainties mark different knowledge debates.
Perceptions of not knowing enough (incomplete knowledge or unpredictability)
can trigger disputes about whether there is sufficient knowledge to support
decision-making. Different ways of knowing (ambiguity) can trigger disputes
around diverging knowledge claims. Ambiguity, however, is frequently not
recognised and is often perceived as incomplete knowledge. The desire of
coalitions to strengthen their position with better knowledge-based arguments
implies high expectations for research. However, additional research will not
change underlying value differences (Sarewitz 2004).We use our classification of
uncertainties to understand knowledge debates and the extent that knowledge
production can resolve them.
Linear model of expertise
We use depoliticisation mechanisms and knowledge uncertainties to char-
acterise the linear model of expertise. The core assumption of the linear
...not knowing enough
Incomplete 
knowledge Unpredictability 
...knowing differently
Ambiguity 
Uncertainty of ...
Figure 1. Schematic of types of uncertainties.
(based on Van Den Hoek 2014).
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model correlates with the technocratic depoliticisation approach and uncer-
tainty as incomplete knowledge, resulting in the following expectations of
the regulation and knowledge debate. First, to depoliticise a human activity
within a regulation debate, experts are required to provide the necessary
knowledge for policy-making. This depoliticisation approach is complicated
when uncertainties result in politicisation of knowledge. Based on the linear
science-policy expectation, the issue requires additional technocratic depo-
liticisation to address the knowledge debate. Lastly, the linear model
assumes that by ending the knowledge debate, it should become clear
how to regulate human activity. In this way, ending the knowledge debate
becomes a necessary condition for ending the regulation debate. Figure 2
summarises this linear expectation from research for decision-making. Our
mussel fishery case study will show a different relation between the knowl-
edge and regulation debates that challenges this linear expectation.
Methodological approach
We use an interpretative approach to understand the mussel fishery con-
troversy (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). Interpretative approaches focus
on different constructions of meaning as ‘people will interpret the social
and material world in various and sometimes conflicting ways’ (Beunen and
Duineveld 2010, p. 325). These differences between people form the basis of
regulation and knowledge debates. Following Mouffe (2000), we view these
debates as a result of conflicting positions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that have
different perspectives. We describe these different positions as discourse
coalitions: ‘a group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of
practices, shares the usage of a particular set of story lines over a particular
1. Debate 
on regulating 
human 
activity
4. Ending the 
debate on human 
activity
depoliticisation
Technocratic
Issue of knowledge 
uncertainties
Technocratic
Politicisation 
2. Debate on 
uncertain 
knowledge
Depoliticisation 3. Ending the 
debate on 
uncertainties
Regulation debate
Knowledge debate
Figure 2. Visualisation of linear expectations of research for closing knowledge and
regulation debates, based on the perceptions of technocratic depoliticisation and
uncertainty as incomplete knowledge.
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period of time’ (Hajer 2006, p. 70). We view these coalitions as having their
own way of knowing (Janssen 2015). In the mussel fishery case, we identify
nature and fishery discourse coalitions (Van der Molen et al. 2015).
In our analysis, we distinguish four periods in the mussel fishery case
(1990–2016), based on crucial decisions that depoliticised the public debate
and changed the regulation of mussel fisheries. We take 1990 as the starting
point, when high bird mortality evoked the first politicisation of mussel
fisheries. The analysis ends in 2016, when we concluded our data collection.
Interviews, participatory observation, field trips and document analysis of
the role of science-policy interactions in the Dutch Wadden Sea1 empiri-
cally inform our case study. We conducted 28 semi-structured interviews
on science-policy interactions in the Wadden Sea, 9 of which specifically
focused on the mussel fishery case with persons from scientific institutes,
nature organisations, the mussel fishery sector and the government. We
analysed case-related research reports, governmental documents, stake-
holder documents, court rulings, parliamentary proceedings, stakeholder
websites, meeting notes and newspaper articles (using the Lexis Nexis
database). For each period, we analysed the data on articulations of uncer-
tainties and legitimations of decisions to identify depoliticisation mechan-
isms and knowledge expectations.
Mussel cultivation and fishery in the Dutch Wadden Sea
The Wadden Sea is a shallow estuarine sea, renowned as a feeding ground
for birds. High tidal dynamics are characteristic: at low tide the littoral areas
fall dry whereas sublittoral areas remain constantly covered by seawater.
Another characteristic of the Wadden Sea is the occurrence of mussel beds,
clusters of blue mussels (Mytilus edulis) that ecologists describe as biodi-
versity hotspots (Dankers and Zuidema 1995). There are naturally growing
mussel banks and mussel cultivation plots. Mussel cultivation in the
Wadden Sea started in the 1950s, with mussel farmers renting seabed
areas from the national government. The mussel fishermen describe their
cultivation practice as farming in the water (Van Der Molen et al. 2015).
Cultivation starts with ‘seeds’, the spatfall of juvenile mussels, which form
banks on the seabed by attaching themselves to old shelves and to each
other. The main inputs for cultivation are juvenile sublittoral mussels,
which are fished in autumn and spring and relocated to cultivation plots.
Fishermen can also use littoral mussel banks to obtain juvenile and grown
mussels. The cultivation plots are in the sublittoral area of the Wadden Sea.
The mussels grow to consumption size in 2–3 years, after which fishermen
bring them to the mussel auction in Yerseke in Zeeland for sale.
In the mussel fishery controversy, we identify two stable discourse
coalitions based on a mussel fishery perspective and a nature conservation
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perspective (Van Der Molen et al. 2015). The core story line of the fishery
discourse coalition is Mussel fishery belongs in the Wadden Sea, articulating
the historical and future place of mussel fisheries and cultivation in the
Wadden Sea (Floor et al. 2016). The main actors in this coalition are the
mussel farmers, represented by the Producers Organisation (PO) Mussel
Culture. They emphasise the symbiotic relation between mussel fishing and
nature protection: mussel cultivation as enriching nature. The ministry
responsible for fishery and nature protection, the LNV Ministry,2 has
largely supported the mussel sector’s position. Science-based experts are
also part of the fishery discourse coalition (Turnhout et al. 2008, Van Der
Molen et al. 2015). Historically, fishery biologists have taken the mussel
fishery activity as a starting point, for example within research on improv-
ing fishing efficiency. During debates, nature organisations and fishermen
placed some scientists explicitly in the fishery coalition; for example,
researchers from the Netherlands Institute for Fisheries Research (RIVO,
currently part of Wageningen Marine Science) (Turnhout et al. 2008).
The main story line of the nature discourse coalition is The Wadden Sea
is first and foremost a nature area, articulating that human activities should
not harm this unique area (Van Der Molen et al. 2015, Floor et al. 2016).
The main actors have been the Wadden Sea Society, the Society for the
Protection of Birds, Fauna Protection and the WAD Foundation. Although
these nature protection organisations have different perspectives on the
extent that fisheries should be in the nature area, they share concerns
about bird populations and seabed disturbance. Their position is strongly
rooted in ecosystem ecology and the interrelations of species, many nature
organisations employees having science-based ecological expertise (Van
Der Molen et al. 2015). Nature organisations and fishermen also placed
within this discourse coalition science-based experts from research insti-
tutes, such as researchers from the Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea
Research (NIOZ). The LNV Ministry also aligns with this discourse coali-
tion, with increased recognition of the nature value of the Wadden Sea in
international and national policy documents.
The mussel fishery controversy (1990–2016)
The politicisation and depoliticisation process and the role of knowledge
occurred in four periods that distinguish different regulation of mussel
fisheries. For an overview of the main events and a summary of the analysis,
see Figure 3 and Table 2.
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Debate on restricting mussel fishery areas (1990–1993)
The high mortality of birds and disappearance of all littoral mussel banks
triggered the politicisation of mussel fishery in the 1990s. In 1990, nature
organisations supported by scientists attempted to limit the cockle fishery3.
However, the Council of State (Raad van State) stopped governmental
regulation because there was no legal basis for limiting shellfish fisheries.
Main events and decisions Research projects
No restriction of cockle and mussel fishery
1990
Almost all littoral mussel banks 
disappeared
High bird mortality in winter 1991
1992
Crucial decision: Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy 
(SCFP): 26% of the Wadden Sea restricted from fishery 
and 60% food reservation for birds
1993
1994
EVA I (1994-1998): evaluation 
of fishery regulation
1995
1996
1997
Adaptation SCFP: additional littoral areas closed 1998
High bird mortality in winter
1999
EVA II (1999-2003): evaluation 
of fishery regulations and 
fishery effect research
2000
Shellfish sector vision on sustainable fishery (ODUS) 2001
2002
2003
European Court of Justice ruling: shellfish fishery as a 
project under the Habitat Directive
2004
Government decision: ban on cockle fishery and permit 
for gas mining
Crucial decision: Support sustainable mussel fishery, no 
more food reservations for birds instead autumn fishery 
restricted to instable mussel banks
Workshops and meetings between fishermen and nature 
organisations until spring 2006
2005
2006
PRODUS project (2006-2013): 
fishery effect research on 
sublittoral nature values
Council of State procedure against mussel seed fishery 
spring 2006 permit
2007Heldoorn informer start to bring nature organisations, 
fishermen and the Ministry together
Council of State ruling: spring 2006 permit invalid
2008Crucial decision: Transition covenant between nature 
organisations, fishermen and the Ministry
Permanently closing 140 ha sublittoral mussel seed banks 2009
Additional closing of 70 ha sublittoral mussel seed banks 2010
2011
2012
2013
Additional closing of 9090 ha sublittoral mussel seed 
banks
2014
2015
2016
Figure 3. Overview of important events, research projects and crucial decisions in the
mussel fishery controversy (1990–2016).
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This triggered a regulation debate between the nature and fishery coalitions,
with reduce fishery areas! versus no limitations of fishery areas! as the
conflicting positions. Nature organizations argued for closing areas to fish-
eries, particularly littoral areas, to leave enough food for birds. Fishermen
emphasised that they had difficulties due to limited mussel spat and inten-
sified eider duck predation on their cultivation plots. According to nature
organisations, nature needed protection from fisheries, blaming fisheries for
the disappearance of the littoral mussel banks and for eider duck mortality.
Fishermen emphasised natural fluctuations of mussel banks and bird popu-
lations. These differences resulted in a knowledge debate: harmful fishery
versus natural fluctuations. In 1993, the LNV Ministry formulated
a compromise between the nature and fishery positions. Mussel fishery
regulation became part of the Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy: restricting
26% of the Wadden Sea area from shellfish fisheries, limiting fishing to
leave sufficient cockles and mussels to satisfy 60% of the food requirement
of the bird populations, and restricting fishing of littoral mussel banks if
their surface coverage was below 2000 ha. Furthermore, the LNV Ministry
planned a science-based evaluation to be ready in 1998, on which the
fishery policy was to be adjusted to restrict additional areas or re-open
them for fisheries (LNV 1993).
During this period (1990–1993), observations of bird mortality and
contestation of fishery effects politicised mussel fisheries. Knowledge played
an important role in this process of politicisation. In contrast to the linear
model, scientific experts were unable to depoliticise the issue. While both
the nature and fishery coalitions acknowledged the importance of knowl-
edge, there was ambiguity about the effects of fishery, especially about the
causes of high bird mortality and loss of the mussel banks. The Ministry
acknowledged this uncertainty by formulating a compromise on fishing
conditions to keep areas open for fisheries and simultaneously protecting
nature. This decision, legitimised by the Ministry’s authority, depoliticised
the debate. With a research-based evaluation, the Ministry proposed
a technocratic approach to guide further decision-making. All stakeholders
perceived research as necessary to evaluate the effects of restricting areas for
fisheries and to reduce the uncertainty about fishery effects.
Continuing debate on sufficient bird protection (1993–2004)
The Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy of 1993 and the slow restoration of
littoral mussel banks restricted the mussel fishery to sublittoral mussels. In
1998, evaluation research (EVA I) showed that the restoration of littoral
mussel banks was very limited (Ens et al. 2004). Because there were
insufficient data from which to draw strong conclusions on fishery effects,
the LNV Ministry initiated a second evaluation project (EVA II). Although
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this technocratic approach restricted debate to knowledge arguments, the
regulation debate on shellfish fisheries continued. Nature organisations
contested cockle and mussel fishery permits in court, claiming that fishery
regulation was insufficient to protect nature as there was again high bird
mortality in the winters of 1999–2001 (Raad van State 2005). Fishermen
claimed that regulation hampered sustainable fishery innovations. In 2001,
the shellfish sector published a sustainable fishery vision, which included an
alternative method of juvenile mussel collection to innovate mussel fishery
and cultivation. Mussel seed collectors with ropes in the water column on
which juvenile mussels attached themselves should reduce seabed distur-
bance and create a more stable mussel seed input (ODUS 2001). However,
in 2002, mussel fishermen also requested a permit to fish on natural littoral
mussel banks. This was unacceptable for nature organisations, and the
Ministry did not grant it (Raad van State 2004). We characterise this mussel
fishery regulation debate as more regulation! versus less regulation!
Knowledge claims about fishery effects supported the positions of the
nature and fishery coalitions. The main concern of the nature coalitions was
bird protection. The removal of mussels would effectively reduce food
availability for birds, especially in years with low numbers of juvenile
mussels. In contrast, the fishery coalition claimed that the overall effect of
mussel fishery and cultivation was positive for nature. The transportation of
juvenile mussels to cultivation plots would increase the number of mussels
because of the better survival conditions on cultivation plots, thus increas-
ing the number of mussels available for birds. The coalitions had their own
interpretations of the research results of EVA I and II, and science-based
experts contested different interpretations of fishery effects. For example,
model calculations in the EVA II project showed that cultivation increased
the number of mussels in the Wadden Sea, which the fishery coalition
perceived as confirmation of their position. The nature coalition, however,
emphasised that, in years with low numbers of juvenile mussels, the actual
effects for bird populations could still be negative. Furthermore, the nature
coalition proposed changing the norm of food availability to restore bird
numbers. We characterise this knowledge debate triggered by ambiguity
about fishery effects as potentially harmful fishery versus positive effects of
mussel cultivation.
Although the EVA II research project took place to guide decision-
making on shellfish fisheries, other processes became more influential.
First, the debate on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea influenced the fishery
debate (Floor et al. 2013). In addition, the ruling of the European Court of
Justice in 2004 that the European Habitat Directive permit procedures also
applied to shellfish fisheries changed the legal setting (ECJ 2004). This
decision implied that the burden of proof was on fishermen to show that
there were no significant negative effects on the Wadden Sea’s nature value
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(Raad van State 2005). Against this background, in 2004, the Dutch govern-
ment decided to support sustainable mussel fishery and support alternative
mussel seed collection experiments, whereas the government banned
mechanical cockle fishery from the Wadden Sea (LNV 2004).
In this period (1993–2004), knowledge did not contribute to depoliticis-
ing the controversy. Even though knowledge arguments structured the
regulation debate, ambiguity about fishery effects amplified the knowledge
debate. The high expectation that the EVA I and II evaluations could
reduce the debate about fishery effects was not met. In contrast, science-
based expertise became part of the debate about fishery effects as contested
expertise. Again, the main uncertainty was the ambiguity about fishery
effects. Fishermen also noted the unpredictability of the natural dynamics
of the Wadden Sea: ‘not everything can be described or explained’ (ODUS
2001, p. 14). Still, fishermen were actively involved in the EVA II project,
which structured the debate on mussel fisheries. For example, the debate on
eider duck protection occurred with ecological arguments on food avail-
ability calculations. However, the ambiguity of the EVA II research results
enhanced the debate instead of depoliticising it. Furthermore, the acknowl-
edgement of incomplete knowledge of effects on sublittoral nature triggered
new research: the PRODUS project (‘PRoject Onderzoek DUurzame
Schelpdiercultuur’), which aimed to support sustainable fishery and
included research on the effects on sublittoral nature by comparing the
biodiversity of fished and unfished plots. The Ministry expressed high
expectations for this research: ‘Knowledge and facts are seen as an oppor-
tunity to bridge the divide of standpoints and visions’ (LNV 2004, p. 8).
Again, the government proposed a technocratic approach for future deci-
sion-making. However, the crucial decision to support sustainable mussel
fishery (and not cockle fishery) in 2004 was based on a decisionist
approach, legitimised through the authority of the government. Although
the Ministry legitimated this decision with its interpretation of the EVA II
results and advised commissions, it was not technocratic in the sense of
being prescribed by science-based experts.
Debate on mussel seed fishery permits (2004–2008)
In 2004, the LNV Ministry decided to support mussel fishery and cultiva-
tion in the Wadden Sea, whereas it banned mechanical cockle fishery (LNV
2004). As a result, the fishery on sublittoral mussel seed banks in spring and
autumn could continue,4 although fishermen now needed a permit under
the European Habitat Directive (92/42/EEC). After a period of low spatfall
and no fishing, the first fishing under this obligation was in autumn 2005.
To determine eligibility for this permit, the Ministry of LNV commissioned
research institute Alterra to write an appropriate assessment (Alterra 2005),
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which concluded that there were no significant negative effects provided
that only unstable mussel banks were fished. For the spring 2006 permit to
fish mussel banks that survived the winter,5 the PO Mussel Culture com-
missioned the consultancy MarinX, which assessed that there were no
significant negative effects (Van Stralen and Sas 2006, Floor et al. 2016).
In 2005 and 2006, several workshops and meetings, organised by the
Ministry of LNV, took place between nature organisations, the PO Mussel
Culture and science-based experts. Although they agreed that fishermen
needed transition time to adopt new practices, they disagreed about the
meaning of sustainable fishery and how quickly innovations should be
realised. These differences between the fishery and nature coalitions’ posi-
tions characterise the regulation debate: mussel fishery and cultivation is
already sustainable versus only mussel fishery without damage to the seabed.
In March 2006, these differences led to discontinuation of regular meet-
ings. Instead, nature organisations began legal proceedings against the
Dutch government’s granting a spring 2006 fishing permit, which redir-
ected their differences towards a debate on the assessment of significant
effects and the certainty of knowledge claims, triggered by the European
Court of Justice condition of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’ (ECJ 2004).
We characterise this knowledge debate as too much incomplete knowledge to
assess effects versus sufficient knowledge to assess there are no significant
effects. The nature coalition questioned if the assessment of no significant
effects was possible. Based on the precautionary principle, they claimed that
there was insufficient knowledge to grant a permit. Incomplete knowledge
of the effects of fisheries on sublittoral nature values implied that there
could possibly be significant effects. In addition, they challenged the knowl-
edge claims on mussel cultivation effects in bad years and food availability
for birds, whereas the fishery coalition claimed that an assessment of ‘no
significant effects’ was possible. Fishermen and the Ministry addressed the
uncertainties about effects on sublittoral nature values with an adaptive
management approach; if the PRODUS results showed negative effects, the
fishery practice would be changed. Furthermore, they stressed the positive
effect of an increase of mussel biomass by relocating mussels to cultivation
plots. In 2007, in parallel with this legal conflict, the Ministry commissioned
an independent facilitator to initiate meetings between nature organisa-
tions, the mussel sector and the Ministry.
In February 2008, the Council of State ruled that the spring 2006 permit
was invalid, stating that there was inadequate understanding of effects to
assess ‘no significant effect’ beyond reasonable scientific doubt (Raad van
State 2008). This triggered a mussel crisis. Fishermen feared for their future,
because without new permits it would be the end of the sector. Fishermen
began the ‘stop the green lie’ media campaign against nature organisations
and scientists who claimed mussel fishery was not sustainable. Initially, the
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minister expected that the PRODUS research could be accelerated to
provide the required scientific basis for new fishery permits. However,
a scientific audit revealed that this was impossible. The ecological research
needed much more time to draw valid conclusions about effects, and the
auditors observed that the results would likely not reduce the controversy
(Herman et al. 2008). In response, the Ministry intensified the search for
co-operation, using an independent facilitator (Heldoorn 2008). In
October 2008, this resulted in the Transition Mussel Sector and Nature
Restoration Wadden Sea Covenant, signed by four nature organisations,6
the PO Mussel Culture and the Ministry. This covenant implied step-by-
step replacement of traditional mussel seed fishery with alternative mussel
seed collection in 2020 and a nature restoration programme for the
Wadden Sea.
In this period (2004–2008), knowledge production did not depoliticise the
debate; instead, the legal decision on the knowledge debate about significant
effect assessment even triggered intensification of the debate. The Council of
State concluded in 2008 that there was insufficient understanding to assess ‘no
significant effects’. We view this as a legal decisionist mechanism to close the
knowledge debate in which the court judged between different expert inter-
pretations on whether there was sufficient knowledge to grant a permit.
However, this decision triggered further politicisation of the regulation debate.
After the Council of State’s 2008 ruling, the public debate on the mussel sector
increased, with intensive discussions in the media and the Dutch parliament.
Relations between fishermen and nature organisations became very tense. It
became clear that the technocratic mechanism based on the PRODUS research
results would not provide a timely answer. Instead, the Ministry emphasised
co-operation. This ‘forced marriage’ between nature organisations and fisher-
men in the transition covenant aimed to prevent further court cases on fishery
permits and guarantee a transition process to innovative and more sustainable
fishery practice. The involvement of the most relevant stakeholders,
a participatory mechanism, legitimised the mussel transition covenant.
Co-operation within the mussel transition covenant (2008–2016)
The mussel transition covenant made it possible for fishermen to obtain
a permit to fish in spring 2009, excepting the newly closed sublittoral areas.
Fishermen also invested in mussel seed collectors, up-scaling the technical
innovation to gradually increase the intake of juvenile mussels from the
water column. Connected to the rise of this new technique, fishermen,
nature organisations and the government agreed to permanently close
additional areas to mussel seed fishery in 2010 and 2014 (PRW 2015).
Science-based experts monitored the impact of mussel seed collectors and
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natural development in the closed areas. In addition, the government
supported research on the restoration of mussel banks.
The covenant depoliticised the debate on mussel fishery regulation by
transferring the issue from the public domain of government to the semi-
private domain of the covenant partners. Although differences between
stakeholders did not disappear, the regulation debate became pacified.
Nature organisations no longer opposed the permits in court. Moreover,
interactions between the actors changed; instead of enforcing their own
perspectives and using knowledge to enhance their positions, they had to
shape the transition process together. For example, nature organisations
and mussel fishermen had to work together to formulate a policy for
juvenile mussel transportation. This is a controversial issue for nature
organisations because of the invasive exotic species risk when transport
takes place from the south of the Netherlands to the Wadden Sea (Van Der
Molen et al. 2015). Through shared fact-finding, a workgroup of fishermen
and nature organisations set up a monitoring programme, based on the
input of science-based experts on species inventories.
The transition covenant pacified the knowledge debate on fishery effects. Co-
operation between covenant partners depoliticised this dispute because the
covenant partners decided that their contesting knowledge claims on fishery
effects were not relevant for the co-operative process. This is very clear in the
reaction to the PRODUS results in 2013; this research indicated both tempora-
rily negative effects of mussel seed fishery in spring and high biodiversity of
mussel cultivation plots (Smaal et al. 2013). After the signing of the covenant,
interest in the PRODUS research declined. According to a researcher: ‘the
agenda of the covenant partners was dominated by other issues than what we
could address with PRODUS’. Despite the government’s and fishermen’s initial
high expectations of this research, the PRODUS results had no impact on
fishery management; to avoid a new debate on knowledge uncertainties, the
covenant partners decided to ignore the results. An interviewee from the mussel
sector remarked: ‘We did not discuss it properly, nobody was interested’.
Nevertheless, the release of the PRODUS results in 2013 triggered scientific
disagreement over the correct interpretation of the results. Scientists from the
NIOZ research institute criticised the original press release for being too positive
to mussel fishery, resulting in a new press release that emphasised the limita-
tions of the research (IMARES 2013a, 2013b). However, stakeholders did not
use or express this ambiguity to start a new mussel fishery regulation debate.
The mussel transition covenant pacified the debate on knowledge uncer-
tainties of fishery effects in this period (2008–2016). Covenant partners used
knowledge instrumentally to support decisions to implement the transition of
mussel fishery practice based on an adaptive management approach of ‘learn-
ing by doing’. There was no resolution of the knowledge debate on fishery
effect uncertainties; however, the public debate on knowledge uncertainties of
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fishery effects disappeared because the covenant depoliticised the regulation
debate. Instead, covenant partners made shared decisions on mussel fishery
management. To give legitimacy to their decisions as covenant partners, they
continued to rely heavily on science-based expertise. ‘Learning by doing’
underpinned the transition, with monitoring and research projects to address
incomplete knowledge and unpredictability. Furthermore, interactions
between nature organisations, mussel fishermen and science-based experts
changed. Instead of coalitions enforcing their own perspective and using
knowledge to enhance their position, they began to work together to shape
the transition process. However, this could be a temporary end to the con-
troversy. First, excluded actors can question the legitimacy of the covenant.
Some important outsiders to the covenant such as shrimpers and recreational
organisations have criticised the covenant, though without repoliticising the
issue. Second, the covenant partners themselves can withdraw from co-
operation. The continuation of opposing views, the limited feasibility of
a complete transition to mussel seed collectors and the formal end date of
the covenant in 2020 threaten the current consensus. However, all actors still
perceive collaboration as mutually beneficial.
Conclusions
No linear relation of knowledge and policy in the mussel case
This research is a response to persistent belief in the linear model of expertise.
According to the linear model, the knowledge debate must first be resolved to
end the regulation debate (see Figure 2). However, our mussel fishery case
study showed a different relation between the two. The Dutch government
initiated large research projects (EVA I, EVA II and PRODUS) with the
expectation that their results would prescribe future decisions on mussel fish-
ery. However, knowledge ambiguity hampered these technocratic expecta-
tions. Moreover, the legal ruling by the Council of State did not end the
knowledge debate. The ruling that there was inadequate understanding of
effects initially increased expectations that research should solve the contro-
versy. However, research could not provide timely knowledge to address the
incomplete knowledge of effects. Instead, mussel fishermen politicised the
issue by accusing nature organisation and scientists of spreading the ‘green
lie’. Only the 2008 covenant between the conflicting parties pacified the con-
troversy and effected a participatory approach. This pacification of the regula-
tion debate circumvented knowledge controversies. Although the covenant
partners still diverged in opinion, they set aside the knowledge ambiguity on
fishery effects (see Figure 4), which made the knowledge debate on fishery
effects irrelevant. We conclude that knowledge consensus was not
a prerequisite for decision-making in this case. Instead, the decisionist and
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participatory depoliticisation mechanism justified the decision for a mussel
transition covenant. In contrast to the expectation that scientific clarity can put
an end to policy controversy, we found that political closure of the regulation
debate ended the knowledge debate.
High expectations of scientific knowledge explained
Although we criticise the linear model of expertise, this model is still
essential to understand the high expectations of scientific knowledge to
resolve controversies. Our distinction between a knowledge debate and
a regulation debate, and the analytical concepts of knowledge uncertainty
and depoliticisation mechanisms help explain these high expectations.
First, stakeholders in the debates perceived knowledge uncertainties
predominantly as incomplete knowledge, even when our analysis shows
that ambiguity about fishery effects was the main knowledge uncertainty in
the decision-making process; instead of acknowledging this ambiguity,
stakeholders initiated research projects with the expectation that the results
would provide clarity about effects. The perception of uncertainty as
incomplete knowledge was reinforced both by the technocratic conditions
in the European Habitat Directive and the 2008 ruling of the Council of
State. Thus, even when the research projects did not result in consensus
among science-based experts, knowledge uncertainties were predominantly
interpreted as incomplete knowledge.
Second, we observed a firm belief in the linear model of expertise among
conflicting parties in the mussel fishery case. Both camps acknowledged
scientific knowledge as a condition of legitimate arguments. Furthermore,
there were high expectations that new research projects would support their
coalition’s position in the controversy. Only during the mussel crisis in
2008 did it become clear to stakeholders that they were mutually dependent
upon each other and that strategic use of scientific arguments would no
longer strengthen their position. This crisis resulted in sufficient political
pressure to depoliticise the regulation debate through a participatory
approach that resulted in the mussel transition covenant. This pacification
of the regulation debate stopped the knowledge debate because the knowl-
edge uncertainties on fishery effects addressed by different discourse coali-
tions became irrelevant to the policy-making process. Still, the belief in
knowledge for decision-making processes continued in the ‘learning by
doing’ approach.
Third, our analysis shows that expectations in line with the linear model
can reinforce depoliticisation through technocratic mechanisms. For exam-
ple, a proposed technocratic approach for further decisions enforced the
legitimacy of the participatory mechanism. The legitimacy of the covenant
was based on the participation of relevant stakeholders and on their
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proposal to base their decisions on an adaptive management approach of
‘learning by doing’. In a similar manner, research projects supported the
legitimacy of the governmental decisions in 1993 and 2004. This shows that
the technocratic mechanism played an important role in the legitimation of
decisions by indicating that future decisions will be based on new informa-
tion. Actors involved anticipated that new research results would resolve
the knowledge debate, and consequently also soften the controversies in the
regulation debate. Even though the actual research projects did not provide
this clarity, expectations of future research persisted.
These findings have broader relevance. The three processes observed –
a dominant perception of uncertainty as incomplete knowledge; the belief of
actors that more knowledge will support their position; and the expectation
that future policy decisions can be based on research results – will likely also
occur in other nature conservation controversies. Simply criticizing the linear
model of expertise will not have an impact on such controversies. Instead, we
propose, there should be better acknowledgement of ambiguity and more
reflection on the expected outcome of research projects. Indicating there is
a social problem, and not just a technical problem, can redirect the contro-
versy to the regulation debate where political choices are necessary.
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Figure 4. Visualisation of the depoliticisation of the regulation debate in 2008 with the
transition covenant that triggered closure of the knowledge debate.
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The role of knowledge production in decision-making processes
This case study has shown that knowledge played an important role in
decision-making processes, without resolving the controversy. Research
projects played strategic, procedural and instrumental roles. All actors
used research as a strategic tool. Nature organisations and mussel fishermen
expected that additional knowledge would support their positions, resulting
in research projects to find ‘better’ knowledge. Although additional knowl-
edge could not reduce their ambiguity, research results increased the com-
plexity of their scientific arguments. In addition, the Ministry used research
in a strategic manner, by making scientists jointly responsible for permit
decisions. Furthermore, research projects served a procedural role as an
important meeting ground for discourse coalitions. Especially in the EVA II
project, those with different perspectives had to work together. In the
covenant, workgroups based on the ‘learning by doing’ approach facilitated
interactions between different perspectives. Finally, stakeholders did not
contest all knowledge produced, but used it instrumentally; for example,
the raw data of mussel calculations and bird counts. These uncontested data
formed the basis of co-operation within the covenant setting. To conclude,
knowledge structured the decision-making process though it did not resolve
the controversy. Knowledge and research can play crucial strategic, proce-
dural and instrumental roles in decision-making processes, but resolving
controversies that are characterised by knowledge ambiguity requires other
depoliticisation processes.
Notes
1. We conducted data collection in January 2011–July 2016 as part of a PhD
project on the role of science-policy interactions in the Wadden Sea. A full list
of interviews is available on request. The authors translated quotes from the
interviews into English.
2. The full name was Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fishery, and later
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. In 2010–2017, it was part of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs.
3. In this period, the fishery debate included cockle and mussel fisheries. This
contribution focuses on the mussel fishery debate; for an overview of the cockle
fishery debate, see Floor et al. (2013).
4. Regulation on bird protection changed in 2004. Instead of yearly food avail-
ability assessments, the government restricted fisheries to unstable mussel seed
banks in autumn and introduced an administrative requirement to record
mussel transports to keep 85% of the fished juvenile mussels in the Wadden
Sea for the winter.
5. These mussel banks have the potential to become multi-year-old wild mussel
banks; see Floor et al. (2016) and Alterra (2005) for details.
6. The following nature organisations signed the covenant (‘Convenant Transitie
Mosselsector en Natuurherstel Waddenzee’): the Society for the Protection of
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Birds, the Wadden Sea Society, the WAD Foundation and the Society for the
Preservation of Nature Monuments (‘Natuurmonumenten’).
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